PREFACE to Relativism and Relativity

by Hugh M. Lewis

A relativist orientation is at once open and non-ideological. By its nature it transcends ideological frameworks, and it incorporates principles of complementariness and contextuality of underdetermined and self-organizing systems. A relativist doctrine is critical and realistic. In fact, a relativist orientation is a realist orientation without equal, and it implies an understanding and approach to knowledge, human knowledge, that is rooted and embedded, derived from and referential to, empirical reality. Relativism comes in a variety of forms. I have come to recognize fundamental forms of relativity of knowledge, including both physical and anthropological relativity. Physical relativity takes various specific forms, and can be extended to embrace a grand cosmology of the total universe, as well as the most fundamental properties and processes that are found to occur in nature. Anthropological relativity is at the opposite end of the continuum, and does not concern so much the traditional questions of culture and ethnocentrism, as it does the fundamental philosophical and epistemological issues of the limits of human knowledge, psychological questions of how we can know, and hermeneutic questions relating to the social construction of our knowledge. The paradox of relativity is the paradox of the origins and ultimate references of our knowledge--at some point, physical and anthropological forms of relativity come together, and upon another level they are fundamentally different in form and in consequences.

By relativism we are referring simultaneously to many different forms taken by the relativity of human knowledge. There are different kinds of relativism in the world, and it makes an important difference to specify which kind we are referring to. It makes a critical difference whether we are talking about historical relativism or social relativism, or whether we are talking about epistemological relativism or philosophical relativism, or ethical relativism or cultural relativism, scientific relativism or religious relativism.

To blithely dismiss all relativisms as the same without regard to which kind is to commit an error of prejudiced misunderstanding of the complexity and multidimensionality of the problem. As any good relativist would say, it would be a mistake of mixing apples and oranges, or at least, of mixing our metaphors.

There are some "false" kinds of relativism which are the product of some common fallacies we are seem prone to; but to equate all of relativism with a few forms of "pseudo-relativism" is to merely compound further an already confused picture.

As to the question of whether or not there really is "relativism" in the world, the answer is clearly and unequivocally that there are many different kinds, but may be no one general thing called "Relativism" of which each is a special sub-case.

It is quite a case of misplaced concretization to spill so much precious ink over the possibility or ontological status of "Relativism" in some general or absolute (nonrelativistic) sense. To speak thus of a sense of "general relativism" amounts to a self-contradictory oxy-moron.

It is more nontrivial to argue the finer points of precisely what kind of relativism we are referring to, its implications for our research and our theory, than to gloss or dismiss outright the entire "Problem" in a simplistic manner.

The ontological reality of relativity (and the ontological relativity of reality) does not therefore spell death of God, the end of truth, the denial of a general theory or human progress in the world or the impossibility of getting good translations on foreign poems. There is nothing inimical between strict scientific practice and sound belief and "softer, looser" relativistic leanings in life. In fact, sound and sober science that is non-ideological in its commitments to some higher truth may in fact require methodologically a special form of empirical relativism.

Relativism merely offers us the sobriety and humility of small, partial truths in the face of a grand Unknown. It remains our only antidote to the infection of ideological loops, deceitful viruses and unfalsifiable cases of "false consciousness."

Relativism remains a problematic issue because for the most part its status has been presumed away in the research of other problems. It has rarely been the focus of much research in itself that does not reduce its status down to some prescriptive, didactic agenda for or against the dragon of relativity.

Much that passes in the name of proving or disproving relativism is misguided by a confusion of the problems which relativism actually poses for our knowledge of the world. The universal order of the acquisition of color terms does not therefore disprove the possible relativity of color terminology and perception and neither does the mere enumeration of exceptional cases of belief or behavior demonstrate the status of an anything goes relativity. At most these kinds of attacks and defenses reveal the general and common lack of understanding of the often paradoxical problematic that Relativism poses for our human world.

Relativism is a real and intrinsic facet, an undeniable quality inherent to our knowledge of the world. It characterizes all human knowledge in varying ways. The reality of relativism and the differences it makes in our knowledge of the world can be empirically demonstrated, and must inevitably be taken into account in all our scientific formulas aiming at universal principles.

In spite of criticism, the doctrine of relativism remains a foundational cornerstone of both anthropological theory and method. It is not too much to claim that the most interesting and valuable aspects of relativism as a general doctrine about human reality have largely passed unnoticed in most of the literature.

While a great deal of ink and ilk have been spent over its pros and cons, its virtue and its dangers, relativism as a general doctrine remains poorly understood, and from a theoretical point of view, less well elaborated than most would suppose. Relativism and relativity are more frequently used as glosses, or catchalls, for its great but mysterious implicitness or contextuality that it so implies.

We must learn to be careful when speaking of things relativistically. We must be quite clear and specific about what we are talking about. There are many different, broadly generic kinds of relativism and relativity, forms that may be only remotely or indirectly related to one another. Though there may be some measure of overlap between some of the categories, such that none are mutually exclusive, each category stands alone by marking out a form of relativism in human reality that is separate and different than any of the others.

There remains the very strong possibility that some more general, theoretical form of relativism and relativity may underlie each of the different kinds, which thus compose variations of a common theme. But it is also possible that understanding at this more general level of relativity may not be simply had or presupposed without a systematic inquiry into the differences and different forms that relativity may take, as well as the several bases for these differences and variations. We cannot also ignore the other possibility that the label of relativity may in fact be insubstantial and disguising the general lack of any common ground between the phenomena encompassed by a survey of its types. In other words, we may have long been taking for granted the ultimate and most basic significances of our concept of relativity, without seriously giving consideration to the full range of phenomena encompassed by the term.

The question and controversy that the general issue of relativism has engendered, especially in anthropology, but also in philosophy, has always been striking as a demonstration of the critical and central importance that this set of notions plays in our understanding of the human world.

Relativism is the source and consequence of some seemingly irresolvable dilemmas and paradoxes about our ability and capacity to know our world with any final certainty. Whatever kind of relativism we deal with, we are treating one dimension or another of the general epistemological problem of human knowledge, of how we know our world, of the limitations that our knowing imposes upon our knowledge of the world, and the way that these constraints shape, not only our experience of the world, but the world itself.

The dilemmas inherent to relativism and sense of intrinsic inevitability about how we perceive and construct our world, makes relativism as a general theoretical problem very intractable. We can either presuppose its foundation in our experience, independent of our experience of it, or we can deny it arbitrarily in the absence of any disconfirming evidence.

It is becoming increasingly unfashionable to become identified as a relativist. Anti-relativism has become the vogue since the tide has gone out on the American political economy. There is no money to be had in defending the cause of relativism and little more remaining with which to be anti-relativist either. The virtue of maintaining a relativist orientation in a world bent upon making us believe that "there is no other way," is that even if and when we get a one dimensional world order and even if we have hegemonic world culture, one person can still stand apart and claim "nothing is necessarily so," and that will be enough. In a relativist world, there are always alternatives, and this assures us that a great deal of hope remains for our world.

It has been erroneous to equate relativism with determinism and the legitimization of every totalitarian empire or fascist culture that comes into being. Evil surely exists in the world, along with power and virtue, but in spite of and not because of relativist doctrine. Evil is not logically or necessarily or naturally forthcoming from a relativist standpoint. Evil proceeds as an indirect consequence of the general failure of relativism in the world.

This can be claimed because the value of relativism comes from its intrinsic sense of realism. Human reality, multiply defined and determined, differentially experienced and expressed, is the anchor and hook of relativist doctrine. One cannot be dispensed with without the forfeiture of the other as well. Furthermore, a relativistic orientation in the world entails a naturally critical and skeptical response toward the world, one that mollifies its paradoxical appeal to universal tolerance and appreciation of difference regardless of the moral consequences. It also entails a certain basic humility and "equality in spirit" in our approach to humankind which is antidotal to prideful ethnocentrism and hierarchical authoritarianism. It allows us, in short, to walk in other peoples' moccasins before passing judgment upon them.

Some claim relativist doctrine to be nothing but ideology inappropriate to genuine scientific discourse. But if relativism is indeed only ideology, so might science be as well, and we may ultimately lack any scientific means of proving the matter, one way or another, except unless we make blind leaps of faith fundamental criteria of scientific validity. Whether or not relativism or science are just ideologies remains really a moot point, for even if they were, both would nonetheless be ideologies well worth considering for their consequences in our world.

The problem of relativism as ideology is just one of its many seemingly irreconcilable dilemmas. The general problem of relativism poses many impossible paradoxes for our understanding in the world, and this is both its main strength and its primary weakness, as these paradoxes both challenge the intellect and intimidate our common ignorance.

If relativism promotes a version of the world not as hard and fast for some people's tastes, it also promises a vision of that world more realistic than those which unnecessarily reify and oversimplify it. Relativism is both much more and much less than either its proponents or opponents have made it out to be. It is less of a paradox and a moral double-entendre and more than "different strokes for different strokes," hermeneutic-psychedelic, anything goes, "going native" rape-proneness. It is for the most part just something different from what reactions, for or against, have made it out to be.